TORTS-MARKET SHARE LIABILITY-THE CALIFORNIA ROULETTE OF
CAUSATION

ELIMINATING THE IDENTIFICATION

REQUIREMENT-

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
Imposing liability in tort traditionally requires a showing that the
plaintiff's "injuries were caused by the act of the defendant or by an
instrumentality under the defendant's control."' This cause-in-fact
requirement has been modified in cases involving joint tortfeasors 2
where the causal link to each specific defendant is difficult to
ascertain. 3 The modifications, the doctrines of "concerted action,"
"alternative liability," and "enterprise liability," emerged primarily
from a desire to achieve an equitable disposition in a given case.'
Courts have applied these doctrines to impose joint and several liability on small groups of defendants who acting together have breached
their duty of care towards an injured party.
The theory of the "concerted action" was the first recognized
modification of the cause-in-fact requirement." Concerted action resuits in liability when joint tortfeasors cooperate in achieving one
result; 6 or when they aid or encourage each other in accomplishing a
knowing breach of duty, even though the act is actually performed by
one person; ' or when one assists the other in achieving a tortious end

Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 136, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). Cause-in-fact "embraces all things which have so
far contributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971). A commonly used test of causa-

tion is the "sine qua non" ("but for") rule: the plaintiff would not have incurred any injuries but
for the defendant's conduct. Id. at 238-39.
2 "Joint tortfeasors" is an expression that has been characterized as "one of those unhappy
phrases of indeterminate meaning, whose repetition has done so much to befog the law." Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 413 (1936).
See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 41, at 241-43.
See Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 708 (1967).
Concerted action can be traced back as early as the year 1302, to actions of joint trespass.
Prosser, supra note 2, at 414 & n.10 and cases cited therein. Under the common law doctrine
imposing joint and several liability the plaintiff was entitled to one judgment. Once the judgment was satisfied all defendants were released from payment. There was no contribution
allowed between joint tortfeasors. Id. at 425. The rule prohibiting contributions between defendants has been modified by case law and statutes which now permit pro rata allocation of damages. Id. at 427-29.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§

876(a) (1977).

' Id. § 876(b). The amount of participation, assistance and encouragement is determined by
the circumstances of the particular case. The actor is not liable if his assistance is not substantial. Id. Comment d. The classical application of the theory of substantial encouragement lead-
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while acting in such a manner that his own conduct could be considered a separate breach of duty., "Express agreement is not necessary; all that is required is . . . a common design or understanding. '
A second theory used to impose liability on multiple defendants
is the doctrine of "double fault and alternative liability.""° Under
alternative liability, the burden of proof of causation shifts to the defendants if the defendants were jointly negligent and the circumstances of the tort render impossible the identification of the
wrongdoer." This shifting of the burden is necessary to prevent the
ing to joint liability is found in "drag-racing" cases. These cases stand for the proposition that
both defendants will be held liable if the two were inciting and encouraging each other, even
though only one defendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Agovino v. Kunze,
151 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960) (plaintiff's car hit by one of two cars racing
through a blind intersection).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 876(c) (1977). An actor is not responsible for acts of
the other participant if such acts were not reasonably foreseeable. Id. Comment d. It is uncertain whether courts will apply the concert action doctrine "when the conduct of either the actor
or the other is free from intent to do harm or negligence but involves strict liability for the
resulting harm." See id. Caveat and Comment f.
The dual aspects of the concerted action doctrine were illustrated in Orser v. George, 252
Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967). In Orser, the plaintiff's estate brought a wrongful
death action against the members of a duck hunting club. Id. at 663, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
Orser died of a wound inflicted by one of two defendants who had been firing one pistol
alternatively. A third defendant, James, had been firing a rifle in the same general direction.
Id. at 664-66, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 711-13. The California Court of Appeals reversed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the two defendants who had handled the fatal pistol since each
could be proven liable as joint tortfeasors under the theory of concerted action. Id. at 668, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 714. The court also reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the third
defendant, James, since it could be shown that by his acts he offered a substantial encouragement to their action. Id.
I Prosser, supra note 2, at 430. Mere knowledge of another defendant's conduct is not
sufficient to establish concerted action unless there is a showing of a tacit agreement between
the parties or of a separate breach of duty created by such knowledge. Id.
"oW. PRossER, supra note 1, § 41, at 243. The rule was first stated in Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), and has been adopted by the REsTATEMENr (SECOND) OF ToRTn at
§ 433B. Prosser considers alternative liability to be a relaxation of the rule requiring the plaintiff
to prove "that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the
result." W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 41 at, 241, 243.
" Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-87, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). Summers involved an action
for damages for injuries caused by one of two defendants who had negligently shot in the
direction of Summers. Since both defendants were equipped with the same gauge shotguns and
the same size pellets and since both fired simultaneously, the plaintiff could not identify which
one of the two defendants caused his injuries. Id. at 82-83, 199 P.2d at 2. The California
Supreme Court held that the defendants bore the burden of exculpating themselves. Id. at
85-86, 199 P.2d at 4. The Summers court relied on Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154
P.2d 687 (1944), where the plaintiff was allowed to avail himself of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to prove causation of an injury suffered by him while he was unconscious on an operating table. Id. at 487-89, 154 P.2d at 688-89. The Summers court analogized that Ybarra stood
for the proposition a plaintiff need only show that the negligence of the defendants "was the
proximate cause of the injury. It [was] up to [the] defendants to explain the cause of the injury." 33 Cal. 2d at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4.
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inequity inherent in denying recovery to a non-negligent plaintiff. 12 A
further justification is that "[o]rdinarily defendants are in a far better
position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the
injury." 13
A third modification of the traditional cause-in-fact requirement
is the doctrine of "enterprise" or "industry-wide" liability. " This
doctrine, a hybrid extension of the principles of concerted action and
alternative liability, seeks to impose liability on an entire industry if it
can be shown that the plaintiff's injury was caused by one of the
"reasonably foreseeable risks" created by the industry."5 The

12

Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). The Summers court noted that

policy reasons underlying joint and several liability mandate that a plaintiff not be required to
apportion the entire injury to one defendant. "[T]he innocent wronged party should not be
deprived of his right to redress. The wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves
any apportionment." Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
" Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). While Summers involved a
situation where both defendants were present, and each culpable to a certain extent, the
alternative liability doctrine also has been applied in situations where there was no such certainty. See, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975). In Anderson, the
plaintiff became paralyzed when the tip of a surgical instrument inserted in his spine during an
operation broke and could not be removed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey placed the
burden on the defendants to exculpate themselves. The court further held that at least one
defendant must be found liable. 67 N.J. at 302-03, 338 A.2d at 7. There was evidence, however, that the instrument previously had been used on approximately twenty occasions by persons not before the court, any one of whom could have been responsible for mishandling the
instrument. Id. at 306-08, 338 A.2d at 9-10 (Mountain, J., dissenting). See also Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970) (fact that defendant could not
disprove causation deemed immaterial since absence of exculpatory evidence was direct and
foreseeable result of defendant's acts).
" Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) Hall developed the elements of enterprise liability and suggested a possible application of the doctrine.
In Hall, the plaintiffs sued all six manufacturers of the blasting caps and their trade association
for injuries to children caused by improperly labeled blasting caps in 12 separate incidents
throughout the United States. Although the plaintiffs could not identify the respective manufacturers they contended that all the defendants should be held jointly and severally liable because, individually and through their trade association, they failed to provide a warning and
because they manufactured unsafe blasting caps. Id. at 359. The court concluded that enterprise liability was applicable in light of the industry's joint awareness of the risks of injury "and
their joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks." Id. at 378.
The precedential value of Hall, however, is questionable since the case was dismissed after
a full consideration of the conflicts of laws issues. The initial 13 causes of action were severed as
to each plaintiff for adjudication in the states where the accidents occurred. Chance v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Subsequently, several of these
cases have been dismissed on other grounds. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 n.22, 607 P.2d 924, 934 n.22, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 142 n.22, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
286 (1980).
1' Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The requirement that foreseeability be expanded to risks likely to be created by the industry is justified by
a "cost and social utility" analysis. When the cost of taking precautions or rectifying a defect
proves lower than the potential harm that could be avoided, courts have imposed a duty on the
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requirement of foreseeability under the enterprise liability doctrine
refers to " 'the kinds of risks which the enterprise is likely to create' "'
rather than the traditional "unreasonable risks of specific conduct in
particular circumstances." 1" To impose liability the plaintiff need
only prove that the manufacturer adhered to an inadequate industrywide standard which created the risk.' 8 The burden of proof then
shifts to the manufacturer to prove it was not the cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.'
Enterprise liability is likely to be applied "to
industries composed of a small number of units," since it "might be
manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small producers." 20
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories21 the supreme court of California rejected the application of these doctrines in personal injury cases
involving a large number of defendants. Instead, the court enunciated
the "market share" theory, another modification of the traditional
cause-in-fact requirement. The legal issue presented was whether the
plaintiff could establish cause-in-fact without identifying which specific
defendant caused the injury.
In 1976 Judith Sindell filed suit in the Los Angeles Superior
Court' against eleven drug manufacturers.2 The complaint alleged
manufacturer to incur these costs. See id. at 366 and cases cited therein. A related justification
for the imposition of liability is that the cost of the injuries should be borne by the manufacturers as the "inevitable and statistically foreseeable 'cost' of" marketing the product for consumption and use. Id. at 368. The doctrine of industry-wide liability is also viewed as an "incentive"
to the industry to adopt safe standards of production. Id.
t6Hall. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 923, 925 (1957)).
17 Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
msSee Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
963, 997 (1978).
"9Hall v. E.1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The
court held that the burden of proof would shift to the defendants after the plaintiffs met a three
step approach to causation. Id. at 379. First, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants
breached their duty of care by showing the industry's joint awareness of and capacity to reduce
the risks; second, they "must establish some casual connection between the group-created risk
and their injuries;" and finally, the plaintiffs must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by the product of one of the named defendants. If all these
factors are met, plaintiffs should not be required to name the specific manufacturer and defendants would bear the burden to exculpate themselves. Id.
' Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
2126 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
2'Allocating Blame-Product-Liability Law is in Flux as Attorneys Test a Radical Doctrine,
Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 5.
2326 Cal. 3d at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The complaint names eleven
defendants as representatives of the class of all manufacturers who sold the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) after 1941. Id. at 593 n.1, 607 P.2d at 925 n.1, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.1. Only five
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that Sindell suffered injuries caused by her pre-birth exposure to
diethylstilbestrol (DES),2" a drug which had been prescribed to the
plaintiff's mother during pregnancy.25 The complaint did not name
26
the specific manufacturer of the drug ingested by Sindell's mother
allegedly because of the latent manifestation of the plaintiff's
injuries 27 and because the drug was a "fungible commodity" which
permitted pharmacists "to fill prescriptions from whatever brand of
DES they had on hand at the time."
Plaintiff sought to impose liability on all of the defendants
irrespective of the actual brand of DES taken by her mother. She
averred that the drug companies jointly and individually behaved tortiously toward her by wrongfully manufacturing DES for use in the
prevention of miscarriages. 29 Plaintiff further contended that the
defendants, however, are involved in the appeal since the actions as to the other defendants
were dismissed on various grounds. Id. at 597-98 & n.4, 607 P.2d at 926 & n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 134 & n.4. Respondents are Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., Rexall Drug Co., E.R.
Squibb & Sons and the Upjohn Co. Id. at 598 n.4, 607 P.2d at 927 n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135
n.4.
DES is a synthetic estrogen that was considered to be an effective and inexpensive substitute for its natural counterpart. It was administered through the 1950's and 60's for treatment of
various sexual maladies including the prevention of miscarriages in difficult pregnancies. Siegler, Fertility of the Diethylstilbestrol-Exposed Offspring, 31 FERTILITY & STERILiTY 601, 601
k1979).
A study in 1946 showed that DES helped problem pregnancies; studies in 1953, however,
showed that the drug was not helpful in preventing miscarriages. Recent interpretation of the
latter study showed a negative correlation as to the drug's effectiveness. Id. In 1971, a third
study ascertained that the offspring of the women who took the drug can develop abnormal
malignancies or cancer. McTaggart, DES-The Pregnancy "Vitamin" That Was a Time Bomb,
PARADE, Sept. 9, 1979, at 3.
Injuries resulting from exposure to DES in the uterus have a latent period of 10 to 12
years, and usually become evident after puberty. Similarly, the injuries are a relatively rare
form of cancer that are treated by surgery, cyrosurgery, and cauterisation. 26 Cal. 3d at 594,
607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The incidence of such cancer in female offspring is
estimated from 1.4 in 1,000 to 1.4 in 10,000; it is believed that approximately 4 to 6 million
women took the drug. The drug was banned by the FDA for use in preventing miscarriages,
but is still used to relieve menopausal symptoms and other sexual maladies. Siegler, supra, at
601-03.
25 26 Cal. 3d at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. Plaintiff's injuries consisted of
precancerous lesions of the vagina, cervix, and breast (adenosis) and a cancerous bladder tumor.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
2 26 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. While plaintiff's complaint
did not specifically state that Sindell was unable to name a manufacturer of the drug, the lack of
identification was admitted in the plaintiff's response to the demurrers entered by the drug
companies. Id., 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
7 Id. at 600, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
0 Id. at 605, 607 P. 2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
" Additional Brief of Appellant at 2-5, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]. Plaintiff avers that each
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defendants were liable due to their joint and concerted enterprise activity, including collaboration in marketing DES and mutual adherence3
to and perpetuation of an inadequate industry-wide safety standard. 0
Specifically, Sindell alleged inadequate warning to the public, breach
of warranties, failure to adequately test the drug, false and fraudulent
representations, and continued marketing of DES after it was shown
to be ineffective in preventing miscarriages.3 '
Defendants demurred on the premise that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action because it did not allege the causal connection between the injuries and a specific manufacturer.32 Finding no
cause of action, the superior court sustained the demurrers and entered judgment for the defendants.3 The court of appeals, accepting
all allegations of the complaint as true for the purpose of the demurrer, held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action against the
defendants under both alternative liability and concerted action
theories." The case was reversed and remanded.1 On appeal, the

defendant acted jointly in the promotion and marketing of "DES on a 'wide-open basis' " and
each knew or should have known of the drug's carcinogenic effects at the time of sale. Id. at 2,
5; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Plaintiff's complaint set
forth ten causes of action, allegedly arising from the "individual and concerted action of the
defendants." Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141-42 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
See notes 5-13 supra and accompanying text.
-1 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. These allegations attempt to
establish a cause of action under the theory of enterprise liability. See notes 15-20 supra and
accompanying text for a discussion of enterprise liability.
1126 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Sindell's brief does not specifically enumerate the defendant's wrongful acts towards plaintiff; rather, it attempts to persuade
with the minimum amount of factual detail. See Brief of Appellant.
2 26 Cal. 3d at 596 & n.3, 607 P.2d 934 & n.3, 163 Cal. Rptr. 134 & n.3.
Sindell v. Boyle Drug Co., No. C 169 127 (order granting summary judgment). See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142-43 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). The superior court
sustained Abbott Laboratories' demurrer with thirty days leave to amend and subsequently
dismissed the action based upon plaintiff's failure to amend her complaint. The demurrers of
the other defendants were granted with prejudice since plaintiff failed to name the specific DES
manufacturer. Id.
' Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 143 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). The court of
appeals declined to address the enterprise liability issue raised by the complaint since it found
sufficient remedies embodied in an action based on alternative and concert action theories. Id.
at 143 n.5. For discussion of these theories see notes 5-13 supra and accompanying text.
' Sindell was consolidated on appeal with a similar case, Rogers v. Rexall Drug Co., Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). Rogers' allegations, like
Sindell's, did not identify the manufacturer of the drug and, therefore, her complaint suffered a
similar fate on the demurrers. Rogers, however, amended her complaint to specify that Eli Lilly
and Co. produced the drug ingested by her mother. The supreme court of California acknowl-
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supreme court of California refused to apply concerted action, 3 6
alternative liability,17 or enterprise liability.-% Writing for the majority,
edged that "the discussion .. .will apply to Rogers only if she does not succeed in establishing
that Eli Lilly and Company manufactured the DES taken by her mother." 26 Cal. 3d at 597,
607 P.2d 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The court also confined the opinion to the allegations in
Sindell's complaint. Id.
m 26 Cal. 3d at 603-06, 607 P.2d at 931-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139-41. The Sindell court
refused to expand the doctrine of concerted action to embrace the DES defendants because the
doctrine primarily encompasses situations involving a small number of individuals who directly
participated or rendered encouragement in a joint activity which resulted in one tortious act.
Furthermore, the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint were insufficient to show a tacit understanding among the defendants or a mutual agreement not to test the drug or not to warn the
public. Finally, there was no evidence that the defendants "substantially aided and encouraged
one another in [the alleged] omissions." 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
140. Indeed, the court could not envision a cause of action supported by the doctrine of concerted action by mere allegations that the defendant produced DES from the same formula and
under FDA approval. Id., 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41. Similarly, the court
believed it would be unjust to impose liability based on common imitative industry practices,
such as mutual reliance on tests and promotion. Such application of the concerted action doctrine would render any manufacturer liable for the defective products of the entire industry
even when there is proof that another manufacturer had made the product. Id., 607 P.2d at
933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
31 Id. at 598-603, 607 P.2d at 928-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-39. The Sindell court also
concluded that the traditional "alternative liability" principles were not a viable means of imposing liability on the DES defendants. The opinion of the court questioned whether the application of alternative liability required that the defendants be in a better position to offer evidence
as to causation. Both Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), and Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970), establish the principle that a
defendant's inability to present exculpatory evidence does not bar liability where such inability
stems from direct and foreseeable circumstances within the defendant's control. See notes 11 &
13 supra. Justice Mosk reasoned that, in Sindell, the inability to identify the particular manufacturer was due to the passage of time, through no fault of either plaintiff or defendants. 26 Cal.
3d at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Therefore, "the absence of evidence of
causation was [not] a 'direct and foreseeable result' of the defendants' failure to provide a warning label." Id. at 601 n.14, 607 P.2d at 930 n.14, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.14. Furthermore, the
possibility that the plaintiff's mother would have recorded the name of the manufacturer if the
drug had been properly labeled was speculative. Id.
A further reason for denying recovery under the alternative liability doctrine was because
all of approximately 200 DES manufacturers were not present before the court as required for
application of this doctrine. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the possibility
that one of the defendants caused this injury was too remote. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at
931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
The court also noted that the Sindell case was distinguishable from other causation cases
since the question posed in those cases concerned the identification of the only manufacturer
who produced the single defective product. See Wetzel v. Eaton, 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn.
1973); Garcia v. Joseph Vince, 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978). By contrast, in
Sindell, all DES manufactured was alleged to be defective; lacking was proof of which specific
manufacturer caused the plaintiff's injuries. 26 Cal. 3d at 603 n.18, 607 P.2d at 931 n.18, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 139 n.18.
- 26 Cal. 3d at 607-10, 607 P.2d 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-43. The Sindell court declined to apply the enterprise liability doctrine. In order to allow recovery under enterprise
liability, the court realized that it would have to impose liability "upon a manufacturer ... for
injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not supply simply because it followed the
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Justice Mosk applied market share liability and held for the plaintiff.3 9
The court concluded that where the specific manufacturers of the
ingested drug cannot be identified through no fault of the plaintiff,
and the drug was produced from a formula identical to that used by
all manufacturers of the drug, the probability that the injury was
caused by a specific manufacturer's product is directly proportional to
the manufacturer's percentage of DES sales to the total market of
DES sold for the purpose of preventing miscarriages.4" The court
held that "[i]f [the] plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a
substantial [aggregate] share of the DES which her mother might
have taken," there is a corresponding probability that the offending
producer is before the court. 4' The burden of proof then shifts to the
defendants to exculpate themselves. 42 Each defendant would be responsible "for the proportion of the judgment represented by its
share of [the] market unless it demonstrates that it could not have
made the product which caused the plaintiff's injuries.""

standards of the industry." Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Justice Mosk
believed that such a result would be unfair due to the government's "pervasive role" in regulating the drug's manufacture coupled with the absence of concerted activities among the defendants, and the lack of evidence supporting allegations of the defendant's joint control of the risk.
Such application of enterprise liability principles to the DES defendants would be inequitable
since the industry was large and decentralized, being comprised of at least 200 manufacturers.
Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
11 Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. The term "market share" was
actually coined by the dissent. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
4o Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court reasoned that under this
approach there was a small "likelihood that the offending producer would escape liability." Id.
at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (footnote omitted). The court adopted one
commentator's justification for the causation related use of the market share:
"[I]f X Manufacturer sold one-fifth of all the DES prescribed for pregnancy and
identification could be made in all cases, X would be the sole defendant in approximately one-fifth of all cases and liable for all the damages in those cases. Under
alternative liability, X would be joined in all cases in which identification could not
be made, but liable for only one-fifth of the total damages in these cases. X would
pay the same amount either way."
Id. n.28 (quoting Comment, supra note 13, at 994).
1 Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
,2 Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
41Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Each defendant's liability would not
correspond exactly to its market share since the named defendants, comprising only a substantial percentage of the market would be liable for 100% of the damages. A defendant could avoid
liability, for example, by proving it did not manufacture DES until after plaintiff was born. It
could also diminish its share of liability by joining other DES manufacturers after the plaintiff
had joined a substantial share of the market. Id. See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 572, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Law Div. 1980) (enumerating other possible means of
exculpation).
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The majority relied on several policy considerations to support
its holding that the plaintiff had a legitimate claim under the newly
created market share theory." These policy arguments commenced
with the general proposition that courts should "fashion remedies to
meet [the] changing needs" of society,45 and culminated with the specific reason that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants the latter should bear the cost of the injury." 46 Additionally, the court believed that the defendants were in a better position
than the plaintiff to pay for the injury,47 and that the imposition of
liability on manufacturers would provide an incentive to the industry
4
to adopt higher product safety standards. 8
The court found that market share liability "significantly diminished" the inequity of shifting the burden of proof to the defendants
since, instead of joint and several liability, damages would be apportioned commensurately with the amount of harm caused by each
manufacturer's product. 4' The minor discrepancies in the correlation
between a defendant's market share and its liability' or the difficulty
in determining the precise market share' did not seriously hinder
the adoption of the market share rule. 2 Finding a cause of action to
26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
" Id. The court paralleled this modification of traditional causation doctrines with the
adaptation of the liability rules that led to the development of products liability. Just as negligence became insufficient as a basis for liability in a complex, industrialized society, so did the
requirement of identification of specific defendants in situations where "science and technology
create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific
producer." Id. See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (negligence standard should not govern product defects liability).
26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Although the absence of
evidence of causation was "not attributable to the defendants," the court considered that
"marketing a drug the effects of which [were] delayed . .. played a significant role in creating
the unavailability of proof." Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
1 Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court cited with approval Justice
Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., which noted that a manufacturer
can always distribute the cost of the risks inherent in its product to " 'the public as a cost of
doing business.' " Id. (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
" 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court considered this
incentive "particularly significant" with respect to drug manufacturers because the consumers
are "virtually helpless to protect" themselves from injuries. Id.
49 Id. at 612, 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 146.
50Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See note 83 infra.
"' 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. The court considered the
difficulties in determining each defendant's market share "largely matters of proof" to be determined at trial. The court noted that the problems were due to the passage of time and to the
nonexclusive use of DES. Id.
52 Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
4
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exist, the supreme court of California, after vacating the opinion of
the court of appeals, reversed the judgment of the superior court and
remanded the case.5
Justice Richardson, joined by Justices Clark and Manuel, dissented from the majority's adoption of the market share doctrine because the theory was not supported by traditional tort principles and
because it could lead to inequitable resultsi" The dissent maintained
that in practice market share liability would extend absolute liability,
which eliminates the requirement of a breach of defendant's duty of
care, by eliminating "the additional necessity of a causal
relationship." 55 Similarly, the theory was deficient because it
allowed proportional recovery against an individual manufacturer
when the mathematical probability that it produced the consumed
drug was remote and speculative.
From a policy standpoint, Justice Richardson disagreed with the
market share theory since it permits the plaintiff who cannot identify
the wrongdoer to "pick and choose [the] targets" of the suit. 57 In
addition to being contrary to traditional tort principles, allowing a
plaintiff this freedom discriminates against plaintiffs who can identify
the manufacturer of the injury-causing product.-8 Similarly, the dissent questioned the majority's justification of imposing liability on the
basis of the defendants' wealth, rather than on the probability of specific causation.51 Furthermore, the market share doctrine discriminates against drug "manufacturers who are amenable to suit in
m 26 Cal. 3d at 588, 613,.607 P.2d at 924, 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 146.
Id. at 614-22, 607 P.2d at 938-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-51 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Justice
Richardson stressed the plaintiff's fundamental burden of proof of causation in a products liability suit. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. Accord, 1 R. HuRSH & H. BAILEY,
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY § 1:41 (2d ed. 1974).
The dissent remarked that the plaintiff's inability to name the specific manufacturer "has
proven fatal in prior [DES] cases." 26 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147
(Richardson, J., dissenting). See Cray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (D. Tex. 1978);
McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978). But see Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 531, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980).
5 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
11Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See notes
63-65 infra and accompanying text. Justice Richardson objected to the inequity of allowing a
plaintiff unable to identify the cause-in-fact of her injuries to join solvent defendants while a
plaintiff who could identify the specific manufacturer had to take a chance that the defendant is
neither amenable to process nor solvent. Id. See also Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13
SUFFOLK L. REV. 980, 1010 (1979).
'026 Cal. 3d at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting). The
dissent noted that "[a] system priding itself on 'equal justice under law' does not flower when
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California," 60 and its adoption will have far-reaching effects including
inhibiting research and development. 6' Finally, the dissent suggested that state legislative action or the institution of an administrative foundation subsidized by a tax on all manufacturers would provide more equitable solutions.62
In attempting to reach a balanced disposition of the causation
issue, the Sindell court fashioned an approach to causation aimed at
minimizing inequities. Motivated by the plaintiff's innocence and her
need for recovery, the court permitted the plaintiff the opportunity to
have her day in court. The majority, however, adopted a position that
necessitates further clarification. At first glance the proposed market
share theory ostensibly sets forth a clear and concise standard, which
allows the rights of the parties to be fairly adjudicated. Upon closer
examination, the theory is susceptible to broad interpretation distorting the noble spirit of the opinion. In addition, the majority made no
attempt to clarify the means of overcoming the practical difficulties
inherent in the market share approach.
A disturbing aspect of the market share theory concerns its discriminatory impact on those plaintiffs able to identify the
manufacturer.63 The court implied that the doctrine is available to a
plaintiff who has unsuccessfully attempted to identify a specific manufacturer of the injury-causing drug. This plaintiff would have a second
chance to recover damages, this time not from one defendant but
from those manufacturers whose production constitutes a substantial
share of the market. 6 In contrast, the plaintiff who has successfully
the liability as well as the damage aspect of a tort action is determined by a defendant's
wealth." Id., 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
- Id. at 617-18, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Assuming that California would be the only state to "adopt so radical a departure from traditional tort
principles," Justice Richardson reasoned that manufacturers sued in California will bear one
hundred percent of the damages while other manufacturers would not be subject to any liability. Id.
61 Id. at 619-20, 607 P.2d at 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Justice Richardson relied on RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k, which
"'"implicitly recognizes the social policy behind the development of new pharmaceutical
preparations.' " Id. at 619, 407 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(quoting McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86-87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 736
(1978)) (emphasis in original). Comment k refers to unavoidably unsafe products whose apparent usefulness and desirability is "attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1977).
65 26 Cal. 3d at 621-22, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
See Note, supra note 58, at 1019-21.
26 Cal. 3d at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135. See also id. at 618, 607 P.2d at
941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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identified the wrongdoer would not be able to use the market share
theory. If he or she fails to recover from the defendant, there is no
second chance. This discriminatory impact is likely to induce plaintiffs
to fail to identify the wrongdoers.65
The market share doctrine also discriminates against defendants
amenable to suit in California. The majority opinion implied that each
manufacturer of DES breached a duty of care towards some plaintiff
and this breach, even if not "matched" to a specific plaintiff, suffices
to allow a cause of action against the manufacturer.'
Only a portion
of all DES manufacturers, however, are subject to the jurisdiction of
the California courts. Under the market share doctrine only a substantial percentage of this portion is 100% responsible for all damages
awarded in the California courts when less than 100% of all breaching
manufacturers would be before the courts. Thus, this limited number
of manufacturers shoulders the financial responsibility of all manufacturers of DES who are not amenable to suit in California.6" Unless
all states adopt the market share doctrine, its use in California will
discriminate against California defendants.6
The cause-in-fact requirement demands that the defendant's conduct be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. 69
The California Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff joins the
manufacturers of a substantial aggregate share of DES in the action,
each defendant bears the burden of disproving causation.7 ' The
court, however, refused to specify what percentage of the market
constitutes a "substantial share." 71 Various trial courts lacking direction will inevitably define the prerequisite level of "substantiality" at
different percentages, thus resulting in inequity.7 2 Moreover, unfairness may ensue if the substantial share includes a large number of
small manufacturers who insignificantly contributed to the overall

See id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J.,dissenting). See
note 58 supra and accompanying text.
6 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). See
note 40 supra.
" See 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J.,dissenting).
26 Cal. 3d at 617-18, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
See note 60 supra.
' W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 41 at 240.
1026 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
"1Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Justice Richardson in his dissent
commented on this lack of "definition or guidance" and stated: "the issue is entirely open-ended
and the answer, presumably, is anyone's guess." Id. at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
" See notes 75-78 infra and accompanying text.
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market and, therefore, would be absolved under traditional
doctrines.7 3 On the other hand, it would be burdensome to join only
large manufacturers who would then have to bear the financial re7
sponsibility of the small producers. 4
A need for defining the relevant market is inextricably intertwined with the requisite determination of substantiality. It cannot be
discerned from the court's opinion whether the relevant market was
national or local in scope. The Sindell court assessed each defendant's
probability of causation by referring to the percentage of DES sold by
each defendant relative to the total market, 75 but also stated that a
plaintiff must join "the manufacturers of a substantial share of the
DES which her mother might have taken." 7 6 While the former standard suggests a focus on the national market, the latter implies a
localized scope of inquiry. Use of a localized market creates a greater
likelihood that the offending manufacturer is before the court and
that those manufacturers which could not have supplied the product
would not be held liable. Practically, however, it may be impossible
77
to define the relevant local market with any degree of certainty.
The assessment of each manufacturer's individual market share
also presents a major practical problem. Accuracy in determining the
individual shares is crucial to ensure overall fairness. Requiring only a
substantial percentage a priori creates an uncertainty as to whether
the wrongdoer has been joined in the action. In addition, since the
"substantial percentage" is the sum of individual market shares, every
inaccuracy in the computation thereof compounds the uncertainty
already introduced in the causation formula. Due to the passage of
time, calculating the actual market share of each defendant at the
time of the drug's ingestion may be as difficult as identifying the particular manufacturer within the context of traditional causation

11

26 Cal. 3d at 615-16, 618-19, 607 P.2d at 937, 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147, 149 (Richardson, J.,dissenting). Prosser stated that "[a] mere possibility of... causation is not enough; and
when . .. the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to
direct a verdict for the defendant." W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 41 at 241. If the assistance or
participation of a defendant is slight, he is usually absolved from liability. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876, Comment d (1977). See also Orser v. George 252 Cal. App. 2d 660,
670-71, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715-16 (1977) (assistance by club members so slight that absent
substantial encouragement the imposition of liability not warranted).
7 See notes 79 & 83 infra and accompanying text.
26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
71Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
77id. at 601 & 613 n.29, 607 P.2d at 930 & 937-38 n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 & 145-46
n.29. In rejecting alternative liability the Sindell court recognized that the defendants may not
have the means to make the identification. The court noted that manufacturers "sell to
wholesalers, who in turn supply the product to physicians and pharmacies" and therefore, they
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doctrines. It will be tedious, if not futile, task to trace the amount
of DES sold twenty years ago by a specific manufacturer for the purpose of preventing miscarriages."8
The inequity of the market share doctrine is tempered by pro
rata allocation of damages since each defendant is liable only for that
part of the judgment proportional to its individual share of the substantial percentage. The court, however, did not address the issue
whether the plaintiff is entitled to full recovery when one of the
several defendants is insolvent. The court's opinion suggests that
damages would be allocated on a strictly several basis, rather than
jointly and severally.7 ' Not being jointly liable, the solvent defendants would not have to compensate the plaintiff for an insolvent defendant's share. A more conservative interpretation of the court's language, however, would apportion the insolvent manufacturer's share
among the solvent defendants.8 0 The latter interpretation, while

do not possess any direct records of the ultimate destination of the drug. Id. at 601, 607 P.2d at
930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138. It is significant that the court did not confront this issue in enunciating the market share doctrine.
It is likely that at the trial a manufacturer's individual percentage will closely parallel its
national percentage due to the lack of evidence defining the local market share.
The relevant market shares will be significantly more difficult to prove because DES was
manufactured for other uses. This factor must be taken into account when calculating the percent sold for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. See 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13 & n.29, 607 P.2d
at 937-38 & n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46 & n.29.
" See 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13 & n.29, 607 P.2d at 937-38 & n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46 &
n.29. See note 77 supra. Justice Richardson considered the market share data to be "entirely
irrelevant and inadmissible" since it is used to allocate liability rather than "to assist in proving,
circumstantially, that a particular defendant probably caused plaintiffs' injuries." Id. at 617, 607
P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Since the plaintiff may not have a means of access to the specific market shares of the
respectivz defendants, some trial courts may further modify the market share doctrine in
favor of the plaintiff. Lower courts may shift to the defendants the burden to disprove allegations concerning their respective market shares. This additional shift of the burden of proof
would be justified by the alternative liability rationale: the defendants are ordinarily in a better
position to offer evidence relating to their activities. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying
text. If such an approach is adopted by courts, the plaintiff, in actuality, will have no burden of
proof as to causation. It will be sufficient that plaintiff allege that she has joined X% of the total
market with each defendant having respective market shares of a, b or c. To impose such a
burden upon defendants as a matter of law would be unjust and unreasonable, especially in
light of the probability that this evidence is unavailable. See 26 Cal. 3d at 614-16, 607 P.2d at
938-39, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
'9 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. See note 82 infra.
'0 Id. The court does not mention that damages will be strictly several, therefore, the opinion could be read to allow for apportionment of damages on a pro rata basis among the solvent
defendants such that the plaintiff receives the full amount of the judgment. See Ferrigno v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 572-73, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Law Div. 1980) (unexculpated
defendants jointly and severally liable with contributions measured by their prorated market
share).
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consistent with the traditional tort principle that a plaintiff is entitled
to the full amount of the judgment, 8' would frustrate the fairness considerations that motivated a pro rata allocation of damages. 2
Assuming strict several damages, the standard expounded in Sindell may not be the most satisfactory balance of the equities. Pro rating damages is contingent upon what constitutes a substantial share of
the market. If a sufficiently low percentage is deemed substantial,
each defendant would pay considerably more than its share of
liability.'
When this excess payment is multiplied by the number of
suits in which a large manufacturer is likely to be joined, the amount
of damages paid would be much greater than "the damages caused by
the DES [a defendant] manufactured. ' ' 8
A more equitable solution would be to apportion the damages
such that each defendant would pay a share exactly equal to its market percentage rather than its share of the substantial percentage.
This standard necessarily implies that the plaintiff would not recover
the entire amount of the judgment, but it would insure that the defendants do not bear a greater burden than their share of culpability. s
The market share doctrine permits a defendant the opportunity
to escape liability by showing that it did not manufacture the particular product which caused the injury.'
In practice, however, given

s Prosser, supra note 2, at 421-22.
12

26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. When examining the fairness of

holding the defendants liable in the absence of specific indentification, the Sindell court rejected the defendant's policy arguments since they were based on the assumption that the
defendants would be held jointly and severally liable. The court stated that "each manufacturer's liability for an injury would be approximately equivalent to the damages caused by the DES
it manufactured." Id.
s3 See 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Assuming 60% of the total market is joined, since damages are pro rated, a defendant with a
20% market share would actually pay 33% of the damages. In other words, defendant has 1/3 of
the substantial aggregate market it will be responsible for 1/3 of the damages. Thus, a defendant
is liable for his portion of the substantial aggregate, rather than his percentage of the total
market.
14 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
1 See note 40 supra. A similar result occurs under the interpretation given above, requiring
strictly several damages, in cases where one of the defendants was insolvent.
Since several damages are motivated by fairness consideration, traditional principles should
not stop the courts from achieving the most equitable result, especially when these principles
have been given little weight in formulating the doctrine. Strictly several damages that are not
prorated would create an incentive to join the largest percentage of the market and, thus,
insure a higher probability of causation. See also notes 80 & 82 supra and accompanying text.
' 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. A defendant can prove, inter
alia, that it did not manufacture DES until after plaintiff was born or that all the DES it
manufactured could not have been sold by the outlet where the plaintiff's mother bought the
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the lapse of twenty years, it would be as difficult for the manufacturer
to disprove causation as it would be for the plaintiff to prove
causation.8" Where a defendant with a significant market share does
exculpate itself, and thus the total market percentage of the remaining defendants drops below the substantial percentage required by
the doctrine, the issue arises whether there is a sufficient certainty of
causation to permit the cause of action to continue. The court failed
to address this issue. It can be argued that the cause of action should
continue even though there no longer exists a substantial percentage
because there is then a greater certainty that the remaining defendants, unable to exculpate themselves, manufactured the injurycausing drug. An equally valid argument is that the cause of action
should not continue because of the now increased certainty that those
manufacturers not joined produced the offending drug. Underlying
the court's justification for imposing liability was that a substantial
percentage of the market is an accurate measure of the probability of
causation-the action should not continue unless it is more likely
than not that the manufacturer of the drug is before the court.88
When exculpation destroys the balance of likelihoods, courts should
require an additional number of defendants to be joined to ensure once
more a higher probability of causation. Such additional joinder can be
avoided by requiring that the substantial percentage be a high percentage of DES marketed in a specific area, thus minimizing the
chances that an offender would escape liability.
The Sindell court was inconsistent in adopting the market share
doctrine as an "extension of" alternative liability. The court, in rejecting the application of alternative liability, considered that the absence
of exculpatory evidence was due to the unforeseen delayed effect of

drug. See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 572, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Law Div.
1980) (other means of exculpation).
17 See notes 74 & 75 supra and accompanying text. The Sindell court also suggested that a
defendant's share of the damages can be minimized by joining other manufacturers. 26 Cal. 3d
at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. While joinder reduces the amount of damages a
defendant would pay, it does not excuse the imposition of liability in disregard of the defendant's clear inability of proof.
As an illustration, suppose the plaintiff had joined 60% of the market and the court determined that 60% constituted a "substantial share of the market." Subsequently, one defendant
whose individual percentage was 30% of the total market was successful in exculpating itself.
Therefore, the remaining percent share becomes 30/70 of 43% of the remaining market-below
the substantial share of 60%. The 40% of the market that was not originally joined now represents 57% of the remaining market and therefore it is more probable that one of these manufacturers had produced the offending drug. If some of these manufacturers (accounting for 17% of
the market) were joined in the action, the total market share would be 60%, or once more a
substantial share.
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the DES ingested, thus it was not a direct and foreseeable consequence of the defendants' acts.89 On the other hand, when justifying
the adoption of market share liability, the court considered the defendants' conduct in marketing a drug with a delayed effect to be a
significant factor leading to the absence of proof.10 The inconsistency
can be reconciled by inferring that the Sindell court has implicitly
sanctioned a shift of the burden of proof of causation in all circumstances where the absence of proof is not attributable to the plaintiff.
This extension is a major departure from alternative liability principles where the shift in the burden of proof was predicated on the
absence of evidence as a direct and foreseeable result of the defendants' conduct. 91
The Sindell opinion left unanswered questions concerning the relationship between causation and duty of care. Since only the causein-fact issue was before the court, the liability issue was not decided.
Therefore, the market share causation standard is potentially applicable in "other areas of business and commercial activities."" This
broad application outside the drug injury cases would not only be
inequitable but also undesirable. If a court were to couple a strict
liability standard, which substitutes for the requirement of a breach
of the defendant's duty of care, with the market share doctrine,
which virtually guarantees a finding of causation, liability greater than
strict liability would result. 93 Defendant-manufacturers then are
placed in an unjust position since a plaintiff need show only that some
defendant may have manufactured the injury-causing product.
Neither breach nor causation would need to be proven.94
Therefore, in the interest of fairness, some fault-based test
should be used in conjunction with the market share doctrine. The
effect of such a test would be that the plaintiff, in receiving the right
to sue through a modified causation doctrine, would lose some of the
benefits granted by strict liability theories.9 5

11 26 Cal. 3d at 601 & n.14, 607 P.2d at 930 & n.14, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 & n.14. See note
37 supra for the court's reasoning.
90Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
1 See notes 10-13 & 37 supra and accompanying text.
9 Id. at 621, 607 P.2d at 943,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting); Note,
supra note 58, at 980.
' See 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 939-40, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
A negligence based test was enunciated in a recent New Jersey opinion. Ferrigno v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Law Div. 1980).
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The most equitable solution to these complex drug injury cases
could be achieved through a consolidated national fund.' The public
policy arguments that have influenced some courts to allow DES
plaintiffs to recover should suffice to create a nationwide foundation
to handle similar cases. The foundation, financed through a tax imposed on manufacturers, would act as a nationwide insurance policy
covering liability resulting from defective drugs.9" It is unlikely,
however, that broad social legislation will provide the answer in the
near future." Thus, the courts remain the only means for redress for
those individuals injured by defective drugs.
The market share doctrine, proposed as a relaxation of traditional
causation principles, considerably extends a manufacturer's sphere of
liability while purporting to achieve an equitable balance. In light of
the practical difficulties, however, it cannot be concluded that this
doctrine presents an equitable solution to complex causation issues.
Further interpretation and modification of the doctrine and full

In Ferrigno, under factual circumstances similar to Sindell, a New Jersey superior court
rejected California's market share doctrine, but held that alternative liability principles were
sufficient to meet the causation requirement. Id. at 567-73, 420 A.2d at 1313-16. See notes
10-13 supra and accompanying text. The unexculpated defendants would be jointly and severally liable with contributions calculated according to their individual market shares. 175 N.J.
Super. at 573, 420 A.2d at 1316.
In addressing the issue of the proper duty of care that should be imposed on the DES
manufacturers, the Ferrigno court set up a multi-tier investigation based on RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to impute
knowledge of the drug's harmful character if at the time of manufacture this "fact was unknowable." 175 N.J. Super. at 576, 420 A.2d at 1318. Therefore, if "without the benefit of time-oftrial hindsight" the drug was effective and a risk-utility analysis showed that the usefulness of
the drug outweighed the risk of injury at the'time of manufacture, then the plaintiff could not
rely on strict liability principles. The court held that in such instances the plaintiff must establish either negligence in production or in the manner of marketing. Id. at 578-79, 420 A.2d at
1319-20. On the other hand, if the manufacturers knew the drug to be ineffective in preventing
miscarriages at the time of marketing, or the drug's foreseeable risks outweighed its utility strict
products liability would apply. Id. at 577, 420 A.2d at 1319.
Ferrigno's causation analysis was rejected in a subsequent DES case where the appellate
division refused to adopt the principles of alternative liability to govern the identification issue
in New Jersey. See Namm v. C.E. Frost & Co., No. A-89-78 (N.J. App. Div. Feb. 5, 1981)
(affirming summary judgment for defendants since plaintiff failed to identify specific manufacturer).
See Note, supra note 58, at 1019-21.
Id. at 1020.
In New Jersey, a legislative bill (S-3096) providing relief from the State to the DES
victims was vetoed due to a lack of funds. Steyer, State Fiscal Crunch Victimizes Those Exposed
to DES Dangers, Newark Star-Ledger, Mar. 9, 1980, at 53.
One viable solution would be a voluntary fund set up by the manufacturers. Such a fund
was created in Sweden to insure against all undesirable drug effects. See Swedes Insured
Against Adverse Drug Effects, MED. NEWS, July 4, 1980, at 10, 15.
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consideration of the practical aspects involved will ultimately decide
its desirability or lack thereof. Absent such clarification, the market
share doctrine myopically champions the principle of caveat manufactor.
Petrina Ruxandra Albulescu

